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Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security exposes an 
understudied contributor to extremism—corruption—examining several 
countries where institutional corruption has fed popular dissatisfaction with 
Western-backed governments, providing Islamic extremists fertile ground for 
recruitment and support.   
 
A former NPR reporter and special adviser to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Sarah Chayes is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule 
of Law Program and the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment.  
She has produced a valuable work informed by her own decade of South Asia 
experience, revealing specific ways government structures in the surveyed 
countries permit and encourage corruption, at the expense the governed.   
 
Ms. Chayes approaches the issue in both a personal and historical way, using 
her own discovery of corruption in Afghanistan to introduce the theme.  To 
put corruption and poor governance into context, she quotes medieval 
European and Islamic “mirrors for princes,” in which past thinkers wrote 
advice to rulers – or rulers to their successors—on how best to rule.  These 
sources reveal a long tradition of corruption and avariciousness in Europe 
and the Middle East, assuming the best rulers should rein them in, ensuring 
fairness to their subjects.  Noting the existence of hundreds of these works, 
she cites English, French, Scottish, Irish, Arab, and Persian writers, and the 
more famous Machiavelli, Erasmus, and Luther, to argue such problems have 
long troubled observers of governance.  She continuously refers to these 
earlier perceptions when surveying the contemporary societies she analyzes. 
 
Chayes describes in detail the unique structure of corruption in many 
countries. She adds an appendix with diagrams showing the flow of money, 
protection, and punishments across various entities or groups, to show how 
corruption and power flows in select countries, both in public and behind the 
scenes.  She provides such diagrams for Afghanistan, Egypt/Pakistan, 
Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Nigeria, and, for comparison purposes, the Catholic 
Church around 1500 and a “Happy” government today.  While Westerners 
working in developing countries quickly understand corruption can be 
pervasive, they often do not grasp way in which a given society operates.  
Chayes performs this service, suggesting each has its own riff on kleptocracy. 
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Focusing on Afghanistan, she notes she was often hoodwinked in her early 
years there, not understanding how hidden relationships influenced specific 
officials’ behaviors.  Noting that corrupt intermediaries often block leaders’ 
access to the people, Chayes cites an example of American leadership seeking 
to preserve relationships with corrupt Afghan officials; she is scathing in her 
criticism of General Stanley McChrystal and his staff for blocking a meeting 
with knowledgeable tribal elders because the Karzai-linked Kandahar 
governor learned of it in advance and raised such a fuss that it was cancelled 
to avoid conflict with the U.S. government’s “partners.”  She criticizes the 
government-to-government focus U.S. military and diplomats often prefer, 
with the West perceiving governments as a bastion of stability, with 
corruption a secondary concern.  She convincingly argues this drives the 
common people from supporting governments that do not treat them fairly, 
forging a breeding ground for extremism and hostility to the West.  The West 
is seen as propping up its oppressors, by active financial support or ignoring 
misdeeds.  She maintains seeking security before good governance is the 
wrong approach and security instead emerges from the citizenry perceiving 
government as just and working in their interest.  Chayes concludes that, in 
Afghanistan, the government was a vertically-integrated criminal 
organization, where corruption flows up, with low-level officials paying off 
their superiors, who then owe them protection, and the highest leaders 
moving money out of the country.   
 
She covers the countries of the Arab Spring, with whole chapters on Egypt 
and Tunisia, touching on Morocco and Algeria.  In the former, even educated 
people cannot get jobs unless they have contacts among the ruling elite, with 
military and other government staff often performing work to benefit 
superiors.    Algerians are too exhausted by the 1990s’ violence to protest.  She 
terms Egypt a “Military Kleptocratic Complex” where the military, which the 
public esteems because of its role in Egypt’s nationalist rebirth, runs whole 
industries for the benefit of its officers, with a parallel system of crony 
corruption for civilian government.  She sees Tunisia as an example of 
“Bureaucratic Kleptocracy,” where the party and family of Ben Ali used the 
private sector, especially banks, to steal brazenly enough to spark the Arab 
Spring, 
 
Uzbekistan is her example of the Post-Soviet space, where she identifies three 
parallel kleptocratic networks.  President Karimov’s daughter’s network 
squeezes money out of international investors, such as telecommunications, 
in exchange for permission to operate, while impeding those unwilling to pay.  
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The two other networks are the cotton sector and the National Security 
Service that controls cross-border activities. 
 
Chayes concludes her country analyses with Nigeria, a “Resource 
Kleptocracy,” where corruption flows downward; the top receives vast oil 
profits, and payments flow down in a patronage system.  Corrupt civil 
servants access public funds through widespread contract fraud, gaining 
positions through education. 
 
She reviews how the anti-corruption fight emerged in Europe, focusing on the 
Dutch revolt against their Hapsburg overlords and the English Civil War, a 
response to Charles I’s autocratic rule.  She traces the concept of popular 
sovereignty and ways to prevent abuse of power from Milton to Locke, 
Montesquieu, and Madison.  She attributes this movement’s development in 
Protestant societies to an awareness, articulated by Martin Luther, of the 
corrupt nature of the official Catholic Church.  The Reformation and the Wars 
of Religion were a revolution against kleptocracy.  In the Netherlands, for 
example, mobs destroyed churches and religious symbols of a church seen as 
fully corrupt, and Chayes terms the perpetrators religious extremists. 
 
The most valuable discussion, though too brief, was Chayes’ prescriptions for 
tackling corruption using specific categories and summing up the points made 
throughout.  Chief of State and Diplomatic Tools should enunciate an 
anticorruption policy, avoid high-profile meetings with corrupt leaders, better 
engage with the populace, support institutions and programs that fight 
corruption, and avoid encouraging short-term economic wins that profit 
kleptocrats.  Intelligence Tools should analyze how corrupt networks 
function.  Financial System Tools and Legal Tools could track and prosecute 
or sanction corrupt officials, with increased efforts to seize assets.  Aid Tools 
could reduce opportunities for theft, choosing implementing partners 
unconnected to the corrupt networks, conditioning funding to avoid 
benefiting kleptocrats, and supporting honest players.  Security Sector Tools 
could tailor military assistance to avoid alliances of convenience and better 
analyze corrupt networks.  Multilateral Tools echo the above in the 
international context.  Business Tools emphasize business’ role – and interest 
– in eliminating corruption.  Citizen Tools allow average citizens to identify 
corruption and corrupt players. 
 
Her short Epilogue entitled “Self-Reflection” expresses her belief that misuse 
of state assets is not limited to the developing world.  She sees the financial 
meltdowns in Ireland and Iceland in the wake of the 2007-2008 global crash 
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as due to the political elite favoring the financial industry.  More controversial 
is her final point that the Great Recession was itself caused by similar avarice 
after the ruling class accepted that Wall Street deregulation was the moral 
goal. The great failure might have been not holding government and business 
leaders in the U.S. criminally responsible for actions causing the recession. 
 
While I have no genuine criticism of the book, it could have noted to how legal 
immunity can inhibit prosecution of corruption.  Many countries grant 
elected and appointed officials full immunity from civil suit and criminal 
prosecution for corrupt acts and even violence.  In contrast, in the United 
States, immunity is limited, with legislators protected while traveling to 
legislative sessions and for statements made in the legislature, with no 
immunity for criminal acts.   
 
Ms. Chayes has produced an insightful work that policy-makers and 
development and national security experts should consider when designing 
approaches to corrupt regimes.  The positive reception to her book suggests 
she has made a long-term contribution to more fine-tuned discussion of what 
threatens international security.   
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